Archive | Search and Seizure RSS for this section

NYT Editorial on Supreme Court Case on Warrantless Search

The New York Times

 

November 12, 2013
When the Police Enter a Home

By 

The home is “at the very core” of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable government intrusion, as the Supreme Court has said repeatedly. It is where a person’s expectation of privacy is greatest.

The first line of defense of this privacy is the warrant requirement. If police officers want to search a home without a warrant, they are required to get a tenant’s consent. If one tenant consents and another does not, the objector’s wish prevails.

But what if the police lawfully arrest the objecting tenant and remove him from the home, may they enter then? That is the question the Supreme Court is considering on Wednesday in Fernandez v. California.

In 2009, Los Angeles police investigating what they believed to be a gang-related assault and robbery saw one of the suspects enter a nearby apartment. They knocked on the door, and a woman holding an infant answered. She had a fresh wound on her face and blood on her hand and shirt. When the police saw the suspect behind her, they asked him to step outside. He said, “You don’t have any right to come in here. I know my rights.”

The police arrested the man, Walter Fernandez, on charges of domestic violence, and he was taken to the police station. An hour later, the police returned to the home and asked the woman, Mr. Fernandez’s girlfriend, if they could enter. She consented, and the subsequent search turned up a shotgun, ammunition and a knife allegedly used in the robbery.

Mr. Fernandez received an enhanced sentence of 14 years for the gang-related assault and robbery. He appealed, arguing that the enhancement was based on evidence collected in an unlawful search of his home. The state court rejected his appeal, finding that the police’s warrantless entry was legal because he was no longer there to object. Once he was gone, the state claimed that his girlfriend’s consent rendered the search lawful.

But there is no reason to complicate existing law in such circumstances. A tenant’s right to object to a warrantless search should not depend on whether he can permanently stand guard at his front door. If the police have probable cause to make an arrest, they will almost surely have the basis for a warrant as well. Warrants can be issued in a matter of minutes, and, in the meantime, the police can secure the home if they are concerned that evidence may be destroyed.

The state contends that obtaining consent is “simpler, faster and less burdensome” than getting a warrant. But that is precisely the point. By forcing the government to get a judge’s approval before intruding into a private home, the warrant requirement ensures oversight of law enforcement and informs citizens that the search has been authorized by a neutral arbiter.

The home, as the court has said, has long enjoyed “special protection as the center of the private lives of our people.” The justices should reaffirm that principle and require police who wish to search a home to get a warrant, even if the only person standing in their way is in a holding cell.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/opinion/when-the-police-enter-a-home.html?_r=0

Federal Prosecutors, in a Policy Shift, Cite Warrantless Wiretaps as Evidence

The New York Times

October 26, 2013

By 

WASHINGTON — The Justice Department for the first time has notified a criminal defendant that evidence being used against him came from a warrantless wiretap, a move that is expected to set up a Supreme Court test of whether such eavesdropping is constitutional.

Prosecutors filed such a notice late Friday in the case of Jamshid Muhtorov, who was charged in Colorado in January 2012 with providing material support to the Islamic Jihad Union, a designated terrorist organization based in Uzbekistan.

Mr. Muhtorov is accused of planning to travel abroad to join the militants and has pleaded not guilty. A criminal complaint against him showed that much of the government’s case was based on intercepted e-mails and phone calls.

The government’s notice allows Mr. Muhtorov’s lawyer to ask a court to suppress the evidence by arguing that it derived from unconstitutional surveillance, setting in motion judicial review of the eavesdropping.

The New York Times reported on Oct. 17 that the decision by prosecutors to notify a defendant about the wiretapping followed a legal policy debate inside the Justice Department.

The debate began in June when Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. discovered that the department’s National Security Division did not notify criminal defendants when eavesdropping without a warrant was an early link in an investigative chain that led to evidence used in court. As a result, none of the defendants knew that they had the right to challenge the warrantless wiretapping law.

The practice contradicted what Mr. Verrilli had told the Supreme Court last year in a case challenging the law, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Legalizing a form of the Bush administration’s program of warrantless surveillance, the law authorized the government to wiretap Americans’ e-mails and phone calls without an individual court order and on domestic soil so long as the surveillance is “targeted” at a foreigner abroad.

A group of plaintiffs led by Amnesty International had challenged the law as unconstitutional. But Mr. Verrilli last year urged the Supreme Court to dismiss the case because those plaintiffs could not prove that they had been wiretapped. In making that argument, he said a defendant who faced evidence derived from the law would have proper legal standing and would be notified, so dismissing the lawsuit by Amnesty International would not close the door to judicial review of the 2008 law. The court accepted that logic, voting 5-to-4 to dismiss the case.

In a statement, Patrick Toomey, staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union, which had represented Amnesty International and the other plaintiffs, hailed the move but criticized the Justice Department’s prior practice.

“We welcome the government’s belated recognition that it must give notice to criminal defendants who it has monitored under the most sweeping surveillance law ever passed by Congress,” Mr. Toomey said. “By withholding notice, the government has avoided judicial review of its dragnet warrantless wiretapping program for five years.”

The Justice Department change traces back to June, when The Times reported that prosecutors in Fort Lauderdale and Chicago had told plaintiffs they did not need to say whether evidence in their cases derived from warrantless wiretapping, in conflict with what the Justice Department had told the Supreme Court.

After reading the article, Mr. Verrilli sought an explanation from the National Security Division, whose lawyers had vetted his briefs and helped him practice for his arguments, according to officials with knowledge of the internal deliberations. It was only then that he learned of the division’s practice of narrowly interpreting its need to notify defendants of evidence “derived from” warrantless wiretapping.

There ensued a wider debate throughout June and July, the officials said. National security prosecutors raised operational concerns: disclosing more to defendants could tip off a foreign target that his communications were being monitored, so intelligence officials might become reluctant to share crucial information that might create problems in a later trial.

Mr. Verrilli was said to have argued that there was no legal basis to conceal from defendants that the evidence derived from legally untested surveillance, preventing them from knowing they had an opportunity to challenge it. Ultimately, his view prevailed and the National Security Division changed its practice going forward, leading to the new filing on Friday in Mr. Muhtorov’s case.

Still, it remains unclear how many other cases — including closed matters in which convicts are already service prison sentences — involved evidence derived from warrantless wiretapping in which the National Security Division did not provide full notice to defendants, nor whether the department will belatedly notify them. Such a notice could lead to efforts to reopen those cases.

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: October 27, 2013

An earlier version of this article incorrectly stated that a criminal complaint showed that much of the government’s case against Jamshid Muhtorov was based on e-mails and phone calls intercepted under a 2008 surveillance law. The complaint does not say that the particular communications it cites were obtained directly from such surveillance.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/us/federal-prosecutors-in-a-policy-shift-cite-warrantless-wiretaps-as-evidence.html?ref=todayspaper&pagewanted=print

NYT – Justices Weigh Freezing Assets Against Hiring Lawyers

By 
WASHINGTON — Kerri and Brian Kaley, a New York couple, were unable to hire a lawyer to defend themselves against serious criminal charges because the government had frozen their assets. That seemed to trouble several justices at a Supreme Court argument on Wednesday.
But it was not clear that a majority of the justices could agree on a way to address the couple’s situation without cutting back on earlier decisions or intruding into what a government lawyer insisted was the job of the grand jury.

The Kaleys were accused of participating in a scheme to obtain and sell prescription medical devices. They said they were likely to win at trial because no one had been harmed by their conduct, a point two justices seemed to find plausible.

The couple’s lawyer, Howard Srebnick, said the case posed a fundamental issue.

“I ask that this court not rule that the government can beggar a defendant into submission,” Mr. Srebnick said. “I ask this court not to rule that the government can impoverish someone without giving them a chance to be heard through their counsel of choice.”

But the relief the Kaleys actually sought was substantially narrower. They did not challenge the general framework established by a pair of 1989 Supreme Court decisions, which ruled that freezing assets before a criminal trial was permissible, even if it frustrated the defendant’s ability to hire a lawyer, so long as there was probable cause that a crime had been committed and the assets were linked to the offenses described in the indictment.

All the Kaleys were seeking was a hearing at which they could try to show that they were entitled to use their money to defend themselves because the charges against them were flawed.

Justice Antonin Scalia said he was uncomfortable with the modest step of allowing a hearing but might be open to a bolder one.

“To save your client, I would prefer a rule that says you cannot, even with a grand jury indictment, prevent the defendant from using funds that are in his possession to hire counsel,” he said. “Don’t need a hearing.”

Later in the argument, he proposed another solution. “I don’t like casting into doubt the judgment of the grand jury,” he said, “but why couldn’t we say that when you’re taking away funds that are needed for hiring a lawyer for your defense, you need something more than probable cause?” he asked. “Couldn’t we make that up?”

Michael R. Dreeben, a deputy United States solicitor general, responded that earlier decisions by the court had ruled out that approach.

Some justices tried to assess the practical consequences of allowing the requested hearings. Justice Elena Kagan said that defendants had never prevailed in any of 25 such hearings conducted in a part of the country that allowed them.

“So what are we going through all this rigamarole for,” she asked, “for the prospect of, you know, coming out the same way in the end?”

Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., who emerged as the Kaleys’ primary defender, said those statistics were only part of the picture.

“Who knows how many hundreds of times the government would have sought to seize the assets but didn’t because they knew they would have to justify it at a hearing?” he asked.

Mr. Dreeben said that grand jury findings of probable cause often serve as a basis for jailing a defendant until trial. It followed, he said, that such findings may also serve as the basis for freezing tainted money.

Chief Justice Roberts rejected the comparison. “It’s not that property is more valuable than liberty or anything like that,” he said. “It’s that the property can be used to hire a lawyer who can keep him out of jail for the next 30 years. So the parallels don’t strike me as useful.”

Mr. Dreeben said that requiring hearings could allow defendants to have an early look at the government’s evidence, put prosecution witnesses at risk and frustrate efforts to pay restitution to crime victims.

Chief Justice Roberts jumped on the last point. A hearing, he said, could also establish whether there had been any victims, a question in dispute in the case, Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/us/justices-weigh-freezing-assets-against-hiring-lawyers.html?_r=0

Above the Law – FBI’s Case Against Silk Road Boss Is A Fascinating Read

It’s been known for quite some time that the feds were desperately trying to hunt down the folks behind Silk Road, the somewhat infamous “dark web” e-commerce site, accessible only via Tor, which was famous mainly for selling drugs in a slightly anonymous fashion. Of course, when the news came out recently that the FBI had used malware to reveal Tor Browser users, many believed that this was part of an attempt to track down Silk Road, and that seems increasingly likely after the FBI announced this morning that it has arrested Silk Road’s owner, Ross William Ulbricht, who went by the moniker “Dread Pirate Roberts” online. Turns out that Ulbricht was based in San Francisco and was arrested at the public library, of all places….The case against him (pdf) is interesting, because beyond just going after him for helping to distribute illegal drugs, they claim that he solicited a Silk Road user in a murder-for-hire request (though he’s not charged with that), to potentially go after a different Silk Road user who was threatening to reveal the identities of people on the site (the user claimed to have hacked a large vendor’s account, and demanded $500,000 to not reveal names). They also go after him (of course) with a CFAA violation claim and a money laundering claim. Of course, we’ve seen the DOJ inflate and pile on charges against people in the past, so it will be worth watching to see what details come out of this — but soliciting a murder, if true, seems like a fairly big deal.

In addition, the complaint against him claims that Silk Road generated 9.5 million Bitcoins in revenue, leading to 600,000 Bitcoins in commissions (or roughly $1.2 billion in sales and $79.8 million in commissions). Of course, that seems noticeably higher than previous research had suggested. It also notes that the FBI itself made over 100 purchases on Silk Road — including ecstasy, cocaine, heroin, LSD and others. Apparently, they wanted a lot of evidence. And, in case you were wondering, the FBI informs us that their orders “have typically shown high purity levels of the drug the item was advertised to be on Silk Road.”

While the details in the complaint seem pretty thorough, there are some tidbits that stand out as questionable. The complaint clearly states that Bitcoin and Tor are both legal and have legitimate purposes, but it also says that Silk Road’s use of proxies to “hide the identities of those that run Silk Road… reflect his awareness of the illegal nature of the Silk Road enterprise.” I don’t quite see how wanting to be anonymous automatically suggests that you’re engaged in illegal behavior. Later in the complaint, the FBI agent spends an awful lot of time talking about how Ulbricht was interested in the Mises Institute, the well-known libertarian think tank. I’m not sure what that has to do with anything. The FBI notes that Dread Pirate Roberts’ defense of Silk Road included quoting Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard (two economists closely associated with the Mises Institute), but lots of people follow the Mises Institute, so that seems like a stretch.

Another questionable tidbit: the FBI notes that Ulbricht posted a question to Stack Overflow using his real name, but “less than one minute later, Ulbricht changed his username at Stack Overflow from ‘Ross Ulbricht’ to ‘frosty.’” and then the FBI agent noted “I know that criminals seeking to hide their identity online will often use pseudononymous usernames to conceal their identity.” Later, after Ulbricht changes the email on the account to frosty@frosty.com — an invalid email address — the FBI agent similarly notes that “criminals seeking to hide their identity online will often use fictitious e-mail addresses.” Well, yes, but the same is true of people with perfectly legitimate reasons to be anonymous, or those who don’t want spam. While there does appear to be plenty of actual evidence, the use of these tidbits seems highly questionable.

The whole extortion/murder for hire story is a bit crazy. As noted above, one user contacted Dread Pirate Roberts, claiming to have hacked another vendor and obtained the details of users, which he’d release if not given $500,000 to pay off another drug supplier. Ulbricht asked the guy who was threatening him, a user who went by the name FriendlyChemist, to put him in touch with that supplier. After FriendlyChemist did so, Ulbricht used the opportunity to try to get that supplier to sell drugs via Silk Road. There was a further discussion, and when FriendlyChemist started getting anxious, the complaint says Ulbricht asked FriendlyChemist’s supplier how much “would be an adequate amount” in order to “put a bounty on his head.” After being quoted a price of $150,000 to $300,000 (rate dependent on “clean” or “not clean”) Ulbricht allegedly complained that the price was high, and noted that he’d previously hired someone to kill someone for $80,000. They eventually agreed to a price of $150,000 (16710 Bitcoins), and Ulbricht was told that the job was done: “Your problem has been taken care of. . . . Rest easy though, because he won’t be blackmailing anyone again. Ever.” Apparently a photo was supplied. The FBI notes that while this supposedly happened in Canada, Canadian law enforcement says that it didn’t happen.

The complaint also notes that Ulbricht has a LinkedIn page which includes a bit of a rant about “using economic theory as a means to abolish the use of coercion and aggression amongst mankind.” It also notes “I am creating an economic simulation to give people a first-hand experience of what it would be like to live in a world without the systemic use of force.” Not sure how one squares that with trying to hire someone to commit murder, but we’ll let others debate that.

It appears that while Ulbricht was mostly careful to cover his tracks, he wasn’t always that careful. The complaint notes that Silk Road was first advertised on different forums by a user named “altoid,” in a manner that indicated altoid was connected with the site. Months later, altoid also posted elsewhere that he was looking to hire an “IT pro in the Bitcoin community” for “a venture backed Bitcoin startup company” — but then told interested people to contact him at his actual gmail address: rossulbricht@gmail.com. And, voila, the FBI had a name. Also, later, when Homeland Security officials intercepted a package that contained a bunch of fake IDs for Ulbricht, they showed up at his home in July. While he generally refused to answer questions, he did tell them that “‘hypothetically’ anyone could go onto a website named ‘Silk Road’ on ‘Tor’ and purchase any drugs or fake identity documents….” There was also the above mentioned Stack Overflow account, which (briefly) used his real name and email address, which indicated that he was working on a Tor hidden service, and posted some code that (in a modified form) was also found on Silk Road.

All in all, there does seem to be a fairly compelling case built against Ulbricht based on this (though, again, we’ve seen in previous DOJ cases where things aren’t always as they seem). At a first glance, they have a lot of evidence on him. However, some questions do remain. At the beginning of the post, we mentioned the whole thing where the FBI was using malware to identify Tor users… but, of course, that doesn’t show up anywhere in the complaint. Instead, the big “breakthrough” was when a “random border search” by DHS turned up those fake identities intended for Ulbricht. However, as Parker Higgins notes, it seems like this could be a case of “parallel construction” whereby the hacking revealed those details, and DHS was then tipped off to check packages sent to Ulbricht, seeking to create “parallel construction” of evidence, in order to launder the fact that the FBI had hacked its way into identifying Tor users. After all, we’d just reported on how the FBI was actively trying to avoid revealing its hacking/malware powers to technologically sophisticated individuals.

Either way, we’re sure that there will be plenty more news on this case.

The whole sealed complaint is available on the next page…

WSJ – Cellphone-Wiretap Ruling Is a Headache for Prosecutors

Opinion Says Authority to Listen In on Calls Doesn’t Cross Federal-Court-District Boundaries

JOE PALAZZOLO

A recent ruling by the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans said that while cellphones may move easily between the country’s 94 federal districts, the authority to tap them doesn’t. The ruling affects the wiretaps typically used in criminal investigations, especially by the Drug Enforcement Administration, which is part of the Justice Department.

Former law-enforcement officials said the Aug. 26 opinion is among the most significant in recent memory governing the use of such wiretaps and could pose administrative headaches for law-enforcement agencies, unless Congress stepped in, which most regard as unlikely.

The appeals court said that for the federal government to intercept calls on a cellphone, either the phone itself or the hub where agents listen in on the calls must be in the district of the judge who authorized the wiretap. The Justice Department had previously interpreted the law to allow it to continue intercepting calls on a phone that wandered outside of the district in which the wiretap was authorized, former officials said. Now, federal investigators in Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas—the states covered by the Fifth Circuit—run the risk of having evidence suppressed if a cellphone they have tapped crosses federal boundaries.

“God help you if the [suspect] is driving down the highway, having a conversation on his cellphone and crosses into another district,” said Mark Eckenwiler, a former Justice Department official who worked on the Fifth Circuit case. While the ruling is only legally binding on those states, defense lawyers across the nation are also likely to invoke it as they seek to get wiretap evidence against their clients thrown out, he added.

The Justice Department has asked the court for a month to consider its next step. A DEA spokeswoman referred questions to the Justice Department, which declined to comment.

In the Fifth Circuit case, DEA agents and federal prosecutors in southern Mississippi who were investigating a drug-trafficking organization received authorization from a local judge to tap the cellphone of Richard North, a Houston native whom they suspected of supplying local dealers with cocaine. Mr. North was stopped in May 2009 by Texas state troopers acting on information from federal investigators who believed he was on his way to make a delivery in Mississippi.

He was released after a search turned up no drugs, and he headed home to Houston. Unaware that his phone was tapped, he called a friend and was overheard telling her that the troopers had failed to uncover the cocaine hidden in his car, according to court documents. A DEA agent listening in from Louisiana forwarded the information to officers in Texas, who stopped him a second time and found the stash.

Mr. North pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute five kilograms of more of cocaine, but he reserved the right to challenge the wiretap on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.

The appeals court decided that the Mississippi judge erred in issuing the warrant, because the phone was in Texas, investigators were in Mississippi and the listening post was in Louisiana, putting them all in separate districts. “In short, the district court…lacked the authority to permit interception of cellphone calls from Texas at a listening post in Louisiana,” the Fifth Circuit said, in an unsigned opinion.

Federal law exempts “mobile interception devices” from jurisdictional requirements, and at least one appeals court, the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago, has interpreted such devices to include cellphones.

Hanni Fakoury, a staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a civil-liberties group, said in an email that the Seventh Circuit ruling allowed the Justice Department to seek out “a more advantageous jurisdiction (and a more sympathetic judge) before applying for a wiretap.” The Fifth Circuit, however, said “mobile interception device” refers to a device used to capture communications and not a mobile phone, restoring what Mr. Fakoury described as an important safeguard against prosecutors seeking judges believed to provide preferential treatment to the government.

Norman J. Silverman, a lawyer for Mr. North, said the decision was the first major “reining in” of the Wiretap Act since 1974, when the Supreme Court ruled that the power to authorize wiretap applications inside the Justice Department was restricted to a few top officials.

In the near term, law-enforcement officials may need to set up temporary listening posts in districts where wiretap warrants are issued, said Mr. Eckenwiler, now senior counsel at Perkins Coie LLP. That solution is unlikely to sit well with the DEA, which uses these kinds of wiretaps more than any other agency and relies heavily on regional listening posts outfitted with sophisticated eavesdropping technology and staffed full-time with federal employees and contractors, who transcribe and translate what they hear. Of the 1,354 federal wiretaps authorized in 2012, 94% were used in narcotics investigations, according to the administrative office of the U.S. Courts.

“If you want to run 15 intercepts, the best place to run them is in one place—not 15 places,” said David Wilson, a retired 32-year veteran of the DEA.

The Justice Department could funnel wiretap applications to the districts with regional listening posts, but that could create delays for cases in which taps need to “get up” quickly to determine deliveries and shipment of drugs, said Stephen J. T’Kach, a former Justice Department official who worked in the surveillance unit.

Write to Joe Palazzolo at joe.palazzolo@wsj.com

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323864604579067033554325594.html

Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy

 

The New York Times

 


August 12, 2013

By 

A federal judge ruled on Monday that the stop-and-frisk tactics of the New York Police Department violated the constitutional rights of minorities in the city, repudiating a major element in the Bloomberg administration’s crime-fighting legacy.

The use of police stops has been widely cited by city officials as a linchpin of New York’s success story in seeing murders and major crimes fall to historic lows. The police say the practice has saved the lives of thousands of young black and Hispanic men by removing thousands of guns from the streets.

But the judge, Shira A. Scheindlin, found that the Police Department resorted to a “policy of indirect racial profiling” as it increased the number of stops in minority communities. That has led to officers’ routinely stopping “blacks and Hispanics who would not have been stopped if they were white.”

The judge called for a federal monitor to oversee broad reforms, including the use of body-worn cameras for some patrol officers, though she was “not ordering an end to the practice of stop-and-frisk.”

In her 195-page decision, Judge Scheindlin concluded that the stops, which soared in number over the last decade as crime continued to decline, demonstrated a widespread disregard for the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, as well as the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause.

Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg angrily accused the judge of deliberately denying the city “a fair trial” and said the city would file an appeal.

Striking a defiant tone, Mr. Bloomberg said, “You’re not going to see any change in tactics overnight.” He said he hoped the appeal process would allow the current stop-and-frisk practices to continue through the end of his administration because “I wouldn’t want to be responsible for a lot of people dying.”

The judge found that for much of the last decade, patrol officers had stopped innocent people without any objective reason to suspect them of wrongdoing. But her criticism went beyond the conduct of police officers.

“I also conclude that the city’s highest officials have turned a blind eye to the evidence that officers are conducting stops in a racially discriminatory manner,” she wrote, citing statements that Mr. Bloomberg and the police commissioner, Raymond W. Kelly, have made in defending the policy.

Judge Scheindlin ordered a number of remedies, including a pilot program in which officers in at least five precincts across the city will wear cameras on their bodies to record street encounters. She also ordered a “joint remedial process” — in essence, a series of community meetings — to solicit public comments on how to reform the department’s tactics.

The judge named Peter L. Zimroth, a partner in Arnold & Porter L.L.P., and a former corporation counsel and prosecutor in the Manhattan district attorney’s office, to monitor the Police Department’s compliance with the United States Constitution. The installation of a monitor will leave the department under a degree of judicial control that is certain to shape the policing strategies under the next mayor.

Judge Scheindlin’s decision grapples with the legacy of Terry v. Ohio, a 1968 ruling by the Supreme Court, which held that stopping and frisking was constitutionally permissible under certain conditions. But she said that changes to the way the New York Police Department employed the practice were needed to ensure that the street stops were carried out in a manner that “protects the rights and liberties of all New Yorkers, while still providing much needed police protection.”

The judge found that the New York police were too quick to deem suspicious behavior that was perfectly innocent, in effect watering down the legal standard required for a stop.

“Blacks are likely targeted for stops based on a lesser degree of objectively founded suspicion than whites,” she wrote.

She noted that officers routinely stopped people partly on the basis of “furtive movements,” a category that officers have testified might encompass any of the following: being fidgety, changing directions, walking in a certain way, grabbing at a pocket or looking over one’s shoulder.

“If officers believe that the behavior described above constitutes furtive movement that justifies a stop, then it is no surprise that stops so rarely produce evidence of criminal activity,” Judge Scheindlin wrote.

She found that in their zeal to identify concealed weapons, officers sometimes stopped people on the grounds that the officer observed a bulge in the person’s pocket; often it turned out that the bulge was caused not by a gun but by a wallet.

“The outline of a commonly carried object such as a wallet or cellphone does not justify a stop or frisk, nor does feeling such an object during a frisk justify a search,” she ruled.

She emphasized what she called the “human toll of unconstitutional stops,” noting that some of the plaintiffs testified that their encounters with the police left them feeling that they did not belong in certain areas of the city. She characterized each stop as “a demeaning and humiliating experience.”

“No one should live in fear of being stopped whenever he leaves his home to go about the activities of daily life,” she wrote.

One of the plaintiffs in the case, Lalit Clarkson, 31, a union organizer, said after the ruling that “the stop-and-frisk policy criminalizes a whole race and community of people, just for going to work, going to get some food, going on a train to go downtown.”

The decision, he said, represents the legal system’s validation of what the black community has known for a long time: that the stop-and-frisk tactics rely on racial profiling.

“What we know, in our community, to be the truth, has never before gone through a massive legal process” and been “shown, point by point, step by step” to be true, he said.

The judge’s ruling, in Floyd v. City of New York, a 2008 class-action lawsuit that represents the broadest legal challenge to the department’s practices, follows a two-month nonjury trial in Federal District Court in Manhattan earlier this year. Her decision cites testimony of about a dozen black or biracial men and one woman who described being stopped, as well as the conclusions of statistical experts who studied police paperwork describing some 4.43 million stops between 2004 and the middle of 2012.

But the stops were not the end of the problem, Judge Scheindlin found. After officers stopped people, they often conducted frisks for weapons, or searched the subjects’ pockets for contraband, like drugs, without any legal grounds for doing so. Also, she found that during police stops, blacks and Hispanics “were more likely to be subjected to the use of force than whites, despite the fact that whites are more likely to be found with weapons or contraband.”

About 83 percent of the stops between 2004 and 2012 involved blacks and Hispanics, even though those two demographics make up just slightly more than 50 percent of the city’s residents. Mr. Bloomberg and Mr. Kelly have explained that disparity by saying it mirrored the disproportionate percentage of crimes committed by young minority men. But Judge Scheindlin dismissed the Police Department’s rationale.

“This might be a valid comparison if the people stopped were criminals,” she wrote, explaining that there was significant evidence that the people being stopped were not criminals. “To the contrary, nearly 90 percent of the people stopped are released without the officer finding any basis for a summons or arrest.”

Rather, Judge Scheindlin found, the stops overwhelmingly involved minority men because police commanders had come to see them as “the right people” to stop.

“It is impermissible to subject all members of a racially defined group to heightened police enforcement because some members of that group are criminals,” she wrote.

Mr. Bloomberg pledged that lawyers for the city, in appealing to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, would argue that the judge was biased against the police. As evidence, he cited the fact that the judge, who has overseen numerous stop-and-frisk cases over the last decade, had encouraged the plaintiffs to steer the Floyd case into her courtroom by marking it as related to an earlier case she had overseen.

The mayor said the judge did “not understand how policing works” and had misinterpreted what the Constitution allowed.

Another example of the use of Protective Sweep to do a Warrantless Search

4th Amendment  – S.D.Ala.: Defendant closed door on arresting officers, got dressed, and surrendered; protective sweep unjustified

USMS showed up at defendant’s house to arrest him. He came to the door in his underwear, and there was a locked security door between him and the officers. He said he’d unlock the door, and he closed the inside door. They heard sounds inside. The officers essentially panicked that he was arming himself, and they were preparing to pry the security door off when he opened it, unlocked it, and came out and surrendered. The protective sweep under Buie was unjustified because there was no reasonable belief anybody else was inside. Otherwise, Buie would justify an entry in every case. United States v. Simmons, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106328 (S.D. Ala. July 30, 2013):

[More:]

First, Simmons’ “retreat” lasted only 45 seconds, which can hardly be characterized as a “long delay.” After he returned to the back door, unlocked the security door, stepped outside and was arrested, whatever suspicion may have been caused by his retreat was dispelled. The movement the deputies heard inside the house occurred in the 45-second interval after Simmons closed the door and before he came back and opened the security door. After Simmons came out, Tameka Jones also came outside, and there was no evidence that any movement was heard from inside after that point. This evidence—brief retreat, movement from inside, followed by the exit of two persons from the residence—does not justify the assumption that other people remained inside. See United States v. Archibald 589 F.3d 289, 300-01 (6th Cir. 2009) (officers could not know from hearing movement inside prior to arrest whether more than one person was inside).

To the extent that the government relies on the danger posed by the situation to justify the search, that reliance is misplaced. The charges against the Defendant cannot provide the basis for reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective sweep after the Defendant has been taken into custody and no longer poses a danger. See United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773, 777 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[defendant’s] dangerousness is not germane to the inquiry into whether the police may conduct a protective sweep in response to a reasonable suspicion of a threat from some other person inside the home”). Likewise, generalizations about dangers posed by certain types of criminals are insufficient to support a protective sweep. United States v. Moran Vargas, 376 F.3d 112, 115-16 (2nd Cir. 2008) (finding that link between drug courier meetings and motel rooms and between drug traffickers and guns did not provide reasonable suspicion that a dangerous person was hiding in the motel room of suspected drug courier).

The government has placed particular emphasis on the danger this arrest situation posed to the officers. The risk of danger to law enforcement at the arrest scene does not provide reasonable suspicion that a person is lurking inside the residence. Otherwise, Buie would be rendered meaningless because every potentially dangerous arrest would justify a protective sweep. Furthermore, officers’ “perceived vulnerability” does not demonstrate a specific and reasonable belief that other persons are present and pose a danger. United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 289, 299-300 (6th Cir. 2009). This is especially true where the danger can be avoided or mitigated. Id. (if inability to see down hallway from inside front door posed danger, prudent course of action would have been to back away, not proceed through the door).

In this case, the deputies testified that they were vulnerable to attack after the arrest as they waited for a patrol car to transport the suspect. According to Buie, a protective sweep should last “no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 335. To reduce their vulnerability to attack from inside the house, the deputies could have used their considerable force (six to eight officers armed with side arms and long arms) to provide cover while they loaded Simmons into one of their cars and departed. The evidence established that it was their choice to wait on the premises for a patrol car when they easily could have transported the Defendant from the scene themselves.

http://fourthamendment.com/blog/index.php?blog=1&title=s_d_ala_defendant_closed_door_on_arresti&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1